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I. INTRODucTION
On April 16, 2008, the Maryland Court of Appeals, 
the highest court in the state, ruled that a woman may withdraw 
consent for vaginal intercourse after penetration has occurred. 
After consent has been withdrawn, the continuation of vaginal 
intercourse by force or threat of force may constitute rape.1 The 
ruling caused a news sensation because the 
defendant, Maouloud Baby, was convicted 
of first degree rape and related charges 
after his female victim testified that he 
“continued to have sex with her for five or 
ten seconds after she asked him to stop.”2 
The over-reaching implications of what 
has been termed “The Five-Second Rule” 
are obvious, because the most difficult 
legal elements to prove in any rape crime 
case are force and non-consent.3 A vic-
tim’s ability to change his or her mind dur-
ing intercourse could effectively remove 
the problem of consent as a barrier to rape 
convictions and give rise to a host of criminal prosecutions.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines rape as “unlawful sexual 
activity with a person without consent and by force or threat of 
injury.”4 At common law, the crime of rape consisted of unlawful 
sexual intercourse by a man with a woman who was not his wife 
through force and against her will and required at least slight 
penetration of the penis into the vagina.5 Currently, Maryland 
statutorily defines the crime of “rape in the first degree” as the 
act of “[engaging] in vaginal intercourse with another by force, 
or the threat of force, without the consent of the other.”6 The 
applicable punishment is “imprisonment not exceeding life.”7 
In contrast, “post-penetration” rape8 describes a situation where 
two people initially engage in consensual sexual intercourse, but 
during intercourse one person “communicates to the other the 
revocation of consent and the other party forces the continuation 
of intercourse against the will of the non-consenting person.”9 
One person decides to stop and the other person does not. Only 
one state has explicit legislation criminalizing post-penetration 
rape: Illinois.10 Until Baby, Maryland was one of two states that 
expressly held that post-penetration continuation of intercourse 
after withdrawal of consent did not constitute rape.11
II. THE BaBy cASE
At trial in 2004 Baby was convicted not only of rape 
in the first degree, but also of committing a sexual offense in 
the second degree and two counts of sexual offense in the third 
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degree, both felonies.12 During deliberation, the jury came to the 
court with questions specifically concerning the effect of post-
penetration withdrawal on consent. The pertinent note read, “[i]f 
a female consents to sex initially and, during the course of the sex 
act to which she consented, for whatever reason, she changes her 
mind and the man continues until climax, does the result consti-
tute rape?”13 The defense argued that the court should respond to 
the note in the negative on the theory that 
the woman consented to penetration.14 The 
prosecution argued that any slight intru-
sion into the vagina is rape.15 The judge 
was confused by the question and avoided 
making a factual determination by telling 
the jury to re-read the initial instructions.16 
The jury submitted another note which 
read, “[i]f at any time the woman says stop 
is that rape?”17 The defendant’s counsel 
requested that the court repeat the prior 
answer. The judge agreed and instructed 
the jury, “[t]his is a question that you as 
a jury must decide. I have given the legal 
definition of rape which includes the definition of consent.”18 The 
jury returned with a guilty verdict, and on February 17, 2005, 
Baby was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment with all but 
five years suspended and five years probation upon release.19
On appeal, Baby argued that the lower court erred in 
refusing his request to instruct the jury to return a verdict of “not 
guilty” if persuaded that the complaining witness consented to 
sexual intercourse but withdrew her consent after penetration. 
Baby also argued that the court erred in denying his motion to 
exclude expert testimony concerning “rape trauma syndrome.”20 
The Court of Special Appeals agreed, overturning Baby’s rape 
and sexual offense convictions and holding that the trial court 
erred in not answering the jury’s questions on consent. Based 
upon its interpretation of the English common law behind Mary-
land’s statutory definition of rape, and relying on Battle	v.	State,21 
the Court of Special Appeals ruled that “if a woman consents to 
sexual intercourse prior to penetration and withdraws the consent 
following penetration, there is no rape.”22
On certiorari, the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed 
the reversal of Baby’s convictions but articulated a new standard 
of consent. The highest state court held that the language in Bat-
tle stating, “ordinarily, if [a woman] consents prior to penetra-
tion and withdraws the consent following penetration, there is 
no rape,” is properly characterized as obiter	dictum and will not 
be afforded precedential weight.23 After a lengthy discussion of 
the history of rape and its original emphasis on punishing those 
who de-flower virgins, the court turned to recent cases in other 
states on the withdrawal of consent post initial penetration. For 
[i]f a female consents to sex 
initially and, during the course 
of the sex act to which she 
consented, for whatever reason, 
she changes her mind and the 
man continues until climax, 
does the result constitute rape?
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example, in State	 v.	 Bunyard,24 under a rape statute similar to 
Maryland’s, the Kansas intermediate appellate court held that 
“a participant in sexual intercourse may withdraw consent after 
penetration has occurred. The continuation of sexual intercourse 
after consent has been withdrawn, and in the presence of force 
or fear, is rape.”25 The Maryland Court of Appeals found the rea-
soning in similar cases in Kansas, Connecticut, and Maine per-
suasive and held that the Maryland rape statute “punishes the act 
of penetration, which persists after the withdrawal of consent.”26 
The court further held that initial penetration does not complete 
the act of intercourse.27 Therefore, a woman may withdraw con-
sent for vaginal intercourse after penetration has occurred, and 
after consent has been withdrawn, the continuation of vaginal 
intercourse by force or the threat of force may constitute rape.28
The court also agreed with the Court of Special Appeals 
that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the issue 
of consent and by simply sending the jury back to review previ-
ous instructions.29 The seven-judge panel was split over the sec-
tion of the opinion addressing a victim’s withdrawal of consent, 
with four judges signing on to the opinion and one concurring.
III. cOMPARISONS wITH OTHER STATES
Although the recent Baby ruling created a firestorm of 
local media coverage in the Washington, DC metropolitan area, 
seven other states ascribe to similar laws on consent in rape cases: 
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, South Dakota, 
and Illinois.30 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine recognized 
a woman’s right to withdraw consent to 
sexual intercourse as early as 1985. Dur-
ing that time, feminists and legal reform-
ists were attacking states’ statutory marital 
rape exemptions as well. Advocates of the 
right to withdraw consent approve of out-
comes such as that in Baby, arguing that 
holding otherwise only serves to deny 
women basic civil rights31 and perpetuates 
social myths about men, women, and sex.
Failure to recognize a person’s ability to withdraw con-
sent to sexual intercourse denies that person dignity and auton-
omy under the law. For example, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina has declared, without any citation to legal authority, 
that “if the actual penetration is accomplished with a woman’s 
consent, the accused is not guilty of rape.”32 Therefore, once a 
woman consents to penetration there can be no rape during that 
act of intercourse, even if the penetration continues subsequently 
by use of force or coercion.33 A woman in North Carolina may 
have a right to say ‘no’ to sex, but she has no right to say ‘stop’. 
Courts addressing the issue of post-penetration withdrawal of 
consent have pointed out the absurd implications of holding that 
post-penetration rape is something less than rape. The Maine 
Supreme Court reasoned that
“if rape occurs only when a male’s entry of the 
female sexual organ is made as a result of com-
pulsion, [rape cases] would turn on whether 
the prosecutrix, on revoking her consent and 
struggling against the defendant’s forcible 
attempt to continue intercourse, succeeds at 
least momentarily in displacing the male sex 
organ.”34
In other words, the court’s reasoning was a very polite 
way of saying that a female victim would have to temporarily 
separate her partner’s sexual organs from her own after asking 
him to stop in order to have legal recourse. Along a different line, 
Judge O’Connell, writing for the Appellate Court of Alaska, has 
also noted that if the crime of rape depended on proof of non-
consent prior to initial penetration, there could be no rape if a 
male penetrated a sleeping victim.35
Feminist scholars claim that judicial and legislative fail-
ure to recognize a person’s right to withdraw consent to sexual 
intercourse at any time exposes adherence to social myths and 
antiquated attitudes underlying rape laws. One such myth is that 
of “The Unstoppable Male,” or the idea that “once a man engages 
in sexual activity, it is physically impossible for him to stop.”36 
The modern articulation of this reasoning is that a man should be 
allowed “reasonable time to withdraw” after hearing a woman’s 
withdrawal of consent.37 Feminist advocates concede that there 
may be a need for a reasonable time analysis and that this would 
be a proper question of fact for a jury.38 Another social myth 
reflected in the debate on withdrawal of consent is that “promis-
cuous women suffer less harm,” or that someone who has already 
put herself in a compromising position is not harmed.39 Finally, 
the most prominent myth in discussions of post-penetration rape 
is the idea that “initial consent waives autonomy.”40 This myth is 
the law in North Carolina, where once a woman initially consents 
to sexual intercourse or penetration, she has, for the purposes 
of a rape prosecution, waived the right to 
withdraw consent.
On the other side of the debate, 
critics point to the danger and uncertainty 
the issue of post-penetration withdrawal 
of consent raises for men. Specifically 
addressing the Baby	 ruling, Pennsylvania 
litigator Julia Morrow argued in a tele-
vised interview with CNN Prime News 
that “this law is literally climbing into 
bed with people and seeking to micromanage the entire sexual 
experience. This law is incredibly dangerous and will open up 
the floodgates.”41 Morrow continued to harp that women should 
take responsibility for “who they bring home” so that innocent 
men will not become victims of this new law.42 Morrow’s con-
cerns about the holding’s implications for men are well-founded. 
Particularly because the specific facts in Baby	refer to a five to 
ten second continuation of sex after protest, men may have to be 
educated to acknowledge that this translates into the need to stop 
immediately when a sexual partner does communicate a wish to 
stop in order to avoid criminal penalty.
Aside from this, Morrow’s reaction reflects a common 
willingness to ignore the real harms suffered by actual rape vic-
tims by preferring hypothetical concerns for men. Additionally, 
the law does climb into bed with people, and always has. Out of 
necessity, and in order to protect people from harm, state legis-
latures define what constitutes a punishable offense, and courts 
interpret matters that come before them. Legislatures and courts 
thereby establish legal definitions of acceptable sexual behavior 





16	 The Modern AMericAn
person may freely withdraw consent to sexual intercourse before 
penetration.43 Even in North Carolina, in situations involv-
ing multiple acts of sexual intercourse, consent for a prior act, 
whether with the defendant or a third party, does not constitute 
consent for a subsequent act of intercourse.44
In the same CNN Prime News interview, former Florida 
prosecutor Mark Eiglarsh opined that Baby should only be used 
as precedent “in the most limited of circumstances by both pros-
ecutors and law enforcement [officials].”45 In Eiglarsh’s opinion, 
“no jury in the world will convict” a man for simply not stopping 
for five seconds during consensual sex.46 Eiglarsh seems to have 
been correct, for the time being. In over a year since the final 
ruling, Baby has not been the basis for any successful prosecu-
tions of rape defendants.47 During this time, the case has been 
cited twice, but only as precedent for criminal procedure mat-
ters.48 In Hutchinson	v.	State, Baby	clearly applied as precedent: 
the complaining witness claimed forcible rape by a stranger and 
the defendant admitted to penetrating the witness “digitally” but 
claimed he stopped when she changed her mind.49 However, the 
decision failed to address the issue of post-penetration with-
drawal of consent entirely and only cited Baby for the Maryland 
standard of evaluating harmless error to a defendant on an evi-
dentiary ruling.50
Iv. IMPLIcATIONS
Understandably, the “five to ten seconds” timeframe 
upon which Baby was convicted is the key source of public out-
cry. However, the facts of the case were 
more complicated than the media would 
suggest. Baby testified that he placed him-
self between the victim’s legs while the two 
were in the backseat of the victim’s car and 
merely attempted to penetrate her with his 
penis, but failed.51 The complaining wit-
ness testified that Baby did penetrate her 
vagina with his penis.52 The victim testi-
fied that first another man forced him-
self upon her in the car. Then Baby made 
advances towards her and verbally made it clear that she could 
not leave until he was finished with her.53 The victim said that 
Baby’s attempts to penetrate her with his penis hurt her, so she 
yelled at him, told him to stop, and even attempted to push him 
off of her but Baby continued to push his penis for about five sec-
onds after the witness asked him to stop.54 Only a construction of 
the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant could negate 
a clear indication that an unwanted sexual assault occurred upon 
an unwilling victim.
Most cases involving the issue of post-penetration with-
drawal of consent consist of a similar fact pattern. The complain-
ing witness makes allegations of forcible rape and the criminally 
accused claims that there was no sexual intercourse, or if there 
was, that it was consensual and he stopped after she asked him to. 
Prosecutors almost never pursue rape charges in cases involving 
the purely hypothetical “we knew each other, we were both into it, 
now she’s claiming rape because she’s angry with me or embar-
rassed about what she did” scenario against which opponents of 
post-penetration withdrawal of consent in rape laws warn.
Most interestingly, the media did not pick up on the fact 
that the defendant walked away as a free man. In order for the 
Maryland Court of Appeals to articulate a new rule that effectu-
ates a human being’s right to exercise free will and choose to stop 
engaging in intercourse, it had to release a previously convicted 
rapist onto the streets. Indeed, “The Five Second Rule” does raise 
a host of concerns such as abuse of litigation and Constitutional 
Due Process concerns for perpetrators who have to be put on 
notice of the law. However, such concerns are beyond the scope 
of this article. As the public record indicates, future rape convic-
tions are unlikely in instances where the victim changed his or 
her mind in the throes of sex. Further, this kind of conviction 
will depend on the ability of the prosecu-
tion to show that the perpetrator continued 
with intercourse despite the victim’s clear 
verbal or behavioral cues to stop. As in 
Baby, a complaining witness may have to 
assert that the defendant caused her pain in 
order to aid in successful prosecution. The 
ability to withdraw consent can be viewed 
either as a triumph for women’s rights or 
as a potential floodgate for litigation that 
infringes upon the rights of innocent men. 
In over a year, the predicted “flood” has 
been less than a leaky faucet. The effects of the “new” Maryland 
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